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Kennedy’s Crisis: How John F. Kennedy Used History to Prevent Armageddon
The year was 1962. The month was October. United States President John F. Kennedy
prepared to address his country; the citizens of the United States, Russia and the rest of
the world listened intently to his words, for the challenge he now faced affected everyone
everywhere. Kennedy would have the task of navigating humanity away from the most
ominous moment in the history of mankind, the Cuban Missile Crisis.

What might have culminated in a nuclear war with the Soviet Union instead resulted
in a peaceful agreement between the leaders of both countries to remove key nuclear
weapons. John F. Kennedy’s role in resolving this crisis was outstanding. Pressured by
his advisors to engage the Soviet Union in conflict due to their placement of missiles on
the island of Cuba, Kennedy nonetheless doggedly sought, and found, a diplomatic
solution to the threat. This thesis will examine how the youngest elected president in our
country’s history had the perception to understand what could result from an
uncompromising and forceful response to its most powerful adversary. Kennedy had a
profound sense of both political history and international relations; he was also famously
interested in decisions made by previous negotiators. The answer to Kennedy’s unique
level gumption and discretion may lie in his past; the role of his father during his youth,
certain authors and politicians whom he admired, as well as his own experience in the
U.S. Navy as a relatively young man. This nurturing created a man who could rise to the
challenge of guiding stubborn nations away from destroying one another.

Cerbone 2
The crisis at hand was as suspenseful as the resolution was spectacular, beginning
when the island of Cuba was drawn into the Cold War between the United States and the
Soviet Union. In 1959, the guerilla leader Fidel Castro ousted military dictator Fulgencio
Batista. Sheldon M. Stern reports that despite Batista’s “close ties” to businesses and
mafia enterprises in the United States, his rival Castro was initially hailed as “a heroic
figure [by] many Americans,” and elicited cheers in New York City when news came of
his victory.1 However, once Castro consolidated power, he ruled Cuba as a dictator for
many decades. It was Castro’s ascension to power in Cuba that brought into motion the
chain of events leading to the Cuban Missile Crisis. The United States and the Soviet
Union had been fighting the Cold War for over a decade, vying for control of countries in
Europe and Asia in the aftermath of World War II. When Castro assumed power,
however, it became apparent during the United States presidential elections that our
country, which allowed Castro to establish power, could no longer tolerate his continued
rule.2 Ultimately, outgoing President Dwight D. Eisenhower severed ties with Cuba,
while Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev embraced a potential ally in the Caribbean and
sought to establish a diplomatic relationship with his country.3

Incoming President John F. Kennedy inherited from the Eisenhower administration a
proposal which would later result in the failed Bay of Pigs invasion. The plan called for a
brigade of 1,500 Cuban exiles to launch a guerilla assault against Castro’s government by
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invading the Cuban Bay of Pigs with secret training and support from U.S. forces.4 The
operation was a “disastrous” failure: all of the trained guerillas were captured or killed,
and Kennedy’s “image as a knowing, sure-footed young leader” was affected early in his
presidency.5 Castro responded to this attack by establishing even closer ties to Russia,
instructing his band to play the worldwide communist anthem during a visit from a
Russian diplomat and announcing publicly that he adhered to the Communist ideology.6
Khrushchev, in two letters to Kennedy, declared that Russia would defend Cuba from all
future invasions but promised not to place missiles on the island. 7 Ultimately, this
assurance would not be sufficient, for Khrushchev did not intend to keep his promise.
On Tuesday, October 16th, 1962, at 11:50a.m., Kennedy’s advisors in the CIA brought
to his attention a series of “secret” missile sites on Cuba, bearing weapons shipped from
the Soviet Union, which were in early stages of assembly.8 Although Kennedy was
enraged, he maintained a calm demeanor as the photo interpreter, Arthur Lundahl,
explained that the missiles were medium-range ballistic weapons that, if launched, could
destroy Washington, D.C. in thirteen minutes. However, the deadly warheads (tips of the
nuclear weapons) were not visible in the photographs, indicating that the missiles would
not be immediately ready to fire.9 As the Russians were not yet aware that Kennedy had
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been made aware of their scheme, there was still time for the president to determine his
next move.

Thus began the most dangerous fortnight in nuclear history. The Cuban Missile Crisis
reached its peak with Fidel Castro “urging [Russia] to use nuclear weapons against their
common enemy,” the United States, and “ended with the Kennedy brothers secretly
offering to give up U.S. missiles in Turkey in exchange for a Soviet climb-down in
Cuba,” according to Michael Dobbs.10 Stern praises Kennedy’s “cautious and thoughtful
leadership” as well as his understanding that “history is not a game. There is no script.”11
Ultimately, President Kennedy tactfully used his gifts of both foresight and insight to
resolve the Cuban Missile Crisis by striking a deal with the Nikita Khrushchev in which
Kennedy agreed to remove ineffective but threatening Jupiter missiles from Turkey, in
exchange for Soviet removal of the missiles from Cuba and Khrushchev’s agreement to
keep this bargain secret.12
President Kennedy’s resolution of the Cuban Missile Crisis was a rare moment in
which a leader was able to make the right decisions under pressure and eliminate the
threat without resorting to a nuclear war. Had Kennedy responded differently, the result
might have been disastrous for the entire world. He had “been set back at the Bay of Pigs.
In 1962, he could not be set back or it could mean war.”13 Still, he was able to provide a
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firm response to the Soviet Union, protect his country, appear as a strong and able leader,
and end the Cuban Missile Crisis peacefully. His brilliance in handling this most
dangerous task was occasioned by his ability to think independently, understand the risks
from all sides and assert his final decision over the hawkish members of his cabinet.
First, John F. Kennedy’s father, Joseph Kennedy, Sr. influenced the future president
during his formative years, and his relationship with his son would contribute
substantially to the latter’s decisions in the face of stress and confrontation. Kennedy
himself downplayed the role of his father in his development as a person; the public
perception “that Jack was the creature of a strong-willed, multi-millionaire father” would
never do, and thus “he was forever denying his father was an influence.”14
Notwithstanding these considerations, Joe Kennedy’s importance in his son’s life was as
crucial as any of the other figures John F. Kennedy admired. He not only oversaw and
encouraged the development of his son’s personality but also his political ambition. In
1957, Joe said of the future president, then a Senator, “‘I got Jack into politics…I was the
one [who] told him…it was his responsibility to run for Congress. He didn’t want to. He
felt he didn’t have the ability and he still feels that way. But I told him he had to.’” 15 It
was this mindset that Kennedy, Sr. encouraged in John, one which caused him to exhibit
determination for his whole life.

Joe Kennedy was a controversial figure who famously cared little for military service.
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Dallek best surmises Joe Kennedy’s views in that field: “The idea of sacrificing his life or
that of any of his generation seemed [to Joe] absurd. He was too cynical about human
nature and Europe’s traditional strife to believe that anything particularly good came out
of the fighting.”16 While many of his old Harvard classmates willingly enlisted during
World War I, Joe Kennedy “saw nothing to be gained personally or nationally by
enlisting,” describing the war as “a senseless slaughter that would ruin victor and
vanquished alike.”17 Although John F. Kennedy did not share his father’s negative view
of war in general, he nevertheless opposed senseless war that ruined both the victors and
the losers, as reflected by his decisions during the Cuban Missile Crisis. In fact, when the
Crisis ended, Kennedy was known to advise his cabinet against “premature jubilation”
and “gloating.”18 Joe’s belief that war was a detriment to both the winner and the loser
was reciprocated by his son in the belief that the prevention of war could be viewed as a
victory for both parties.
For Joe Kennedy, family was “‘the only happiness that lasts.’” In the early stages of
World War II, Joe Kennedy, serving as an ambassador to Britain, “was reviled in
England for his defeatism and regarded as a coward when, during Luftwaffe bombings in
1940, he left London to spend his nights at a country estate.”19 While his son would find
some fulfillment in military service as a young man, as president he would share his
father’s disinclination to sacrifice the lives of a generation of soldiers if it could be
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avoided through diplomacy. In accordance with his father’s belief that war ruins both the
winners and the losers, President Kennedy would later understand that the resolution of
the Cuban Missile Crisis was a victory not only for his country but also the Soviets.
Alternatively, Joe Kennedy “was more often than not brilliantly insightful about
domestic affairs, particularly the country’s economic prospects.”20 His “misjudgment” of
“external developments” resulted from his understanding of “world problems not on
moral or political grounds but rather on how he felt they might inhibit his entrepreneurial
ventures and, worse, cut short his life or, later, that of his sons.”21 To that extent, nothing
was more important to Joe Kennedy than his own success and that of his sons.

This sense of ambition began when, in place of the military, he took a position at a
bank and later at Bethlehem Steel’s Fore River Company, a Massachusetts-based
shipbuilding plant. This “assuaged his conscience about avoiding military serve,” Dallek
states, but “[more] important, the experience, business contacts and, most of all the
chance to demonstrate his effectiveness in managing a multimillion-dollar enterprise
were invaluable in opening the way to bigger opportunities.”22 Like President Kennedy,
Joe Kennedy was known for being a hard worker with “inventiveness for efficiency and
effectiveness” which “he brought to every task.”23 Additionally, John F. Kennedy’s keen
intellect and charismatic personality likely had its origins in Joe Kennedy. The father’s
business acumen led to an article published by the New York Herald Tribune describing
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Kennedy as, “The person who now monopolizes conversation in the studios and on
locations [who] is not an actor, but one of the executives of this important new industry.
His name is Joseph P. Kennedy.”24 This personality would resurface years later when the
entire world would know and love the charisma his son inherited.

Additionally, Joe Kennedy indirectly encouraged his children to think independently.
John F. Kennedy’s famous propensity for making independent decisions and defending
his viewpoints in the face of adversity no doubt originated in Joe Kennedy’s willingness
to respect and engender independent ideas in his sons. Lasky relates an interview between
Kennedy and Drew Pearson in which Pearson questioned whether Kennedy was
influenced by his father’s political views. Kennedy replied, “‘Father wants me to be
President all right…But as far as influencing me, I think my voting record in the Senate
speaks for itself. He and I have disagreed on foreign policy and domestic issues for many
years, but always very amicably.’”25 On at least two other occasions, when questioned by
Robert Hartmann and Henry Brandon respectively, Kennedy insisted that his father didn’t
try to force Kennedy to conform to his opinion but rather to develop his own. Brandon
asked the pointed question of whether seeing Kennedy become President was more
important to his father than having his son agree with his ideas and views. “‘No,’” replied
Kennedy, “‘[He] feels…that they should determine their own lives and make their own
decisions. His responsibility is not to impose his political views on his children. It makes
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a much more successful and lasting relationship, I think, when a parent does not.’”26 His
father thus gave Kennedy the gift of independent thinking in addition to ambition, both of
which would serve him well during the Cuban Missile Crisis.

When encouraging John F. Kennedy to apply himself as his elder brother Joe did, his
father would say, “‘I don’t want to give the impression that I’m a nagger, for goodness
knows I think that is the worst thing any parent can be…I definitely know [that] you can
go a long way. After all, I would be lacking even as a friend if I did not urge you to take
advantage of the qualities you have…I am always urging you to do the best you can.’”27
Kennedy’s father’s influence on his son was thus to “get all you can out of what God has
given you,” but did not extend to forcing his son to conform to his own beliefs.28 He
understood that the best way to help his son to succeed was to encourage him to succeed
and let him develop his own viewpoint. As John F. Kennedy later said, “‘My father
wanted me to see both sides of the street.’”29
Joe Kennedy, Jr. himself, John F. Kennedy’s older brother, was crucial to President
Kennedy’s political success and his reasoning during the Cuban Missile Crisis. Lasky
writes that Joe, Jr. was “driving, domineering [and] hot-tempered” and “the pace set by
Joe was too difficult for Jack to follow.”30 Joe, Jr. was for many years the only Kennedy
brother permitted to speak with his father at mealtimes; Joseph Kennedy, Sr. saw in his
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eldest son future political success.31 John F. Kennedy’s relationship with his brother was
a complex one. On one hand, Joe, Jr. inspired competition and a role model. The future
president would describe his brother in writing, “‘I don’t think I can ever remember
seeing him sit back in a chair and relax…Even when still, there was always a sense of
motion forcibly restrained…his intense enthusiasm for everything he did and his
exceptional stamina.’”32 On the other hand, the future president would often strain
himself by competing with his brother to impress his father and, as he grew older, “he
wanted to break away from the shadow of his brother” against whom, in the words of his
dean at Harvard University, “‘Jack was bound to play second fiddle.’”33 Kennedy
admired his brother’s boundless energy and ability to apply himself, which he sought to
emulate. Since this proved difficult, Kennedy learned from an early age to struggle and
use his abilities to the utmost.

Joe Kennedy, Jr. provided John F. Kennedy with one of his deepest, most personal
memories from World War II, which eventually served as a connection to the lost
soldiers and sailors of war and strengthened Kennedy’s resolve to avoid needless tragedy.
By August of 1944, Joe, Jr. had served enough time in the armed forces to return home
but instead “volunteered for a mission so dangerous that some members of his ground
crew pleaded with him not to go,” according to Ted Kennedy.34 Joe, Jr. and an assistant
were to pilot an “experimental drone” deployed to bomb Germany. Once the drone was
steered on its proper course, they were to eject themselves over the English Channel and
31
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allow it to destroy its target. Due to a possible technical error, the drone exploded before
Joe, Jr. and his copilots were due to eject themselves.35
Upon hearing the news of his brother’s death, John F. Kennedy suggested that his
family go sailing, which “steered” his family “from nearly unendurable grief across the
healing waters on the long, hard course toward renewal and hope.”36 Three weeks later,
Kennedy’s sister Kathleen’s husband of four months, Billy Cavendish, would be shot in
Belgium.37 Although Joe, Jr. would be posthumously awarded the Navy Cross by the
United States Navy, neither Joe Kennedy, Sr. nor John F. Kennedy would forget that his
brother’s life was lost due to war. As president, John F. Kennedy understood that young
men like his brother and brother-in-law would die and that even a glorious death would
not return them to their families.
John F. Kennedy’s position as the son of one of the richest and most ambitious men in
America granted him a sense of independence that at first proved difficult for him to
apply. Although it would later prove useful to the President, John F. Kennedy, the
student, found himself on occasion to be at odds with his environment. As a student, he
refused to be subjected to “sharply delineated bounds” and “rebelled against
school…authority.”38 As a youth, his precocity caused displeasure among his superiors.
In 1935, he graduated from Choate sixty-fourth of one hundred twelve students, never
wanted to attend Harvard University and his rise to the presidency was so unanticipated
35
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by his former classmates that in 1961 they posted a sign at his former dorm room titled,
“Be Kind to Your Roommate,” while the dorm’s head described Kennedy as
“‘reasonably inconspicuous.’”39 He matured “slowly” and his famous sense of drive and
ambition “was then channeled into unrealized attempts at campus prominence,” such as a
failed attempt for a seat on the Student Council.40 During his freshman and sophomore
years in college, John F. Kennedy “took the ‘gentleman’s C’ in most subjects, and a C
average was just enough to keep him out of trouble with the Dean’s office.”41 During
these years, “he…refused to fit in,” and was regarded as a bright young man who seemed
unable to properly apply himself.42 He was thus regarded as immature and misguided. As
the son of a rich and powerful man, the stigma of being over-privileged as well caused
him to venture from his father’s shadow. Ultimately, however, Kennedy’s competitive
and ambitious spirit would allow him to harness his independent nature and drive to
become one of the most respected presidents in our country’s history.

More importantly, as the son of an ambassador, John F. Kennedy had opportunities to
witness the diplomacy and negotiations that were involved with foreign policy. On one
hand, Kennedy opposed appeasement because it was clear that Adolf Hitler was reaping
an advantage from Neville Chamberlain’s government. One of Kennedy’s idols was Sir
Winston Churchill, who inspired his nation to unite against the Nazi threat. Kennedy
admired Churchill for being a decisive but intelligent leader, whose speeches contained
“powerful oratory that would later inspire the nation in the darkest hours of the war”
39
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which “left an indelible impression on [Kennedy].”43 Additionally, his ambassador father
gave him opportunities to practice “hands-on diplomacy” as a young man.44 Therefore,
Kennedy gained “a developing impulse to question prevailing wisdom,” and in October
of 1939 he published a column denouncing what he saw as a hasty willingness to engage
in war with Germany on the part of the Allies, opting instead for “a quick, negotiated end
to the fighting through the good offices of President Roosevelt.”45 While shunning
appeasement or inaction, Kennedy believed that leaders should have a pragmatic
approach to warfare and try to exhaust other options, such as the diplomacy of President
Roosevelt, before they deemed war inevitable. It was at this early age that he came to the
conclusion that presidents had an “obligation” to utilize every possible strategy to
negotiate peace before turning to war. This notion would follow him for the rest of his
short but successful life, and one day he would take his own advice in lieu of other
people’s, thereby bringing a “quick, negotiated end” to the Cuban Missile Crisis.

Nevertheless, Kennedy never advocated for caving in to the demands of enemy
nations, nor did he believe leaders should lose track of the seriousness of any given
confrontation. He had a keen interest in foreign policy as a young man; his senior thesis
at Harvard University, entitled “Why England Slept,” criticized the appeasement of Adolf
Hitler and the failure of the British to respond firmly to the dictator’s demands. Kennedy
wrote, “What does this mean for our future? The outcome of the present war [World War
II] will throw more light on the subject but what can be learned from a study of the events
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preceding it?”46 Additionally, he saw the importance of not “patting [oneself] on the back
for past performance,” noting “that the preparation for modern warfare is totally different
from that of previous wars.”47 In reviewing history, Kennedy came to the understanding
that action should be taken in the event of any threat. Unlike the appeasers during the
1930s, Kennedy promised that “if Cuba should possess a capacity to carry out offensive
actions against the United States…the United States would act.”48 With characteristic
tact, he added, “But the United States will not take any action that the situation does not
require and will take whatever action the situation does require along the grounds which I
indicated in my opening statement.”49

In 1957, several years before his presidential run, Kennedy would publish a collection
of volumes, titled Profiles in Courage, in which he admired statesmen who, in his
opinion, demonstrated great courage. They ranged from well-known John Quincy Adams
to lesser-known Robert A. Taft. The overriding attributes of this collection of statesmen
was their ability to make unpopular decisions which agreed with their own consciences.
For Kennedy, “one’s need to maintain his own respect for himself was more important to
him than his popularity with others…a reputation for integrity and courage was stronger
than his desire to maintain his office.”50 Kennedy’s idea of a successful and good leader
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was one who placed higher esteem on “his conscience, his personal standard of ethics, his
integrity or morality [and] his faith that his course was the best one, and would ultimately
be vindicated,” which needed to be stronger than “the pressures of public disapproval
[and] his fear of public reprisal.”51 Kennedy himself understood that as president, he
would implement certain policies and make certain choices that would not be accepted by
everyone. With his experiences in the Navy and his overall aptitude for foreign policy,
President Kennedy felt that he was better qualified to determine the reaction to Soviet
placement of missiles on Cuba. Although many members of his cabinet did not approve,
he was able to courageously stand by his principles. Some of these principles Kennedy
had concerning compromise can be traced to the figures he admired in Profiles in
Courage. Daniel Webster, a famous Senator and Secretary of State, and Sam Houston, a
politician from Texas, both spoke in favor of compromise during our country’s history.

Kennedy admired Daniel Webster for speaking in favor of the Compromise of 1850,
which was opposed by pro-slavery Democrats in the South. Although he aspired to be
President, Webster “preferred to risk his career and his reputation rather than risk the
Union.”52 He argued against secession of slave states and identified primarily as an
American – rather than aligning himself with the popular interests of the North and
South.53 Kennedy especially respected Webster for his willingness to stand for his ideals,
despite adversity. Kennedy wrote that Webster “neither could have intended his speech as
an improvement of his political popularity nor permitted his ambitions to weaken his plea
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for the Union,” and concluded his assessment by asserting that, even at the point of death,
Webster proclaimed his loyalty to his country and his indifference to the drop in his
popularity, for his convictions were more important.54

Additionally, Kennedy admired the courage of Senator Sam Houston of Texas. He
was a southern Democrat who nonetheless spoke in favor of the Compromise of 1850,
which limited the power of the southern, slave-holding states, and spoke against leaving
the Union. Like Webster, Houston claimed, “‘I know neither North nor South; I know
only the Union.’”55 He described his vote in favor of compromise, rather than serving the
interests of a single faction in the United States, as “‘the most unpopular vote I ever gave
[but] the wisest and most patriotic.’”56 In addition to the courage of Webster and
Houston, Kennedy admired their ability to favor compromise above popularity. In his
introduction, Kennedy wrote, “We should not be too hasty in condemning all
compromise as bad morals. For politics and legislation are not matters for inflexible
principles or unattainable ideals.”57 Kennedy believed that compromise provided a leader
with “a sense of all things possible,” and served to check the interests of extremist
factions and narrow-minded politics.58 Compromise was underrated and at times tended
to be the best possible course of action, though it was often scorned by the masses. As
President, Kennedy would remain courageous and reach a compromise with the Soviets
at the disapproval of some members of his cabinet. He sought to emulate the leaders he
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felt served the best, most patriotic interests of their country, even if they did not always
receive praise from others.
As a diplomat’s son, Kennedy learned to favor negotiation, but his characteristic
opposition to engaging in a full-scale war with the Soviets during the Cuban Missile
Crisis was the result of several negative experiences during his service in the United
States Navy. Not only did he understand the consequences of failing to take action but
also the consequences of an impulsive and hasty action. Stern writes of a Kennedy
“cleverer and better informed than his generals and the hawks in his Cabinet and to have
the nerve to face them down.”59 This “heroism…came out of Kennedy’s personal past,”
manifesting in a “special contempt for the senior brass supposedly in control of the
war.”60 Kennedy viewed these officers as responsible for the deaths of several of his
close acquaintances and mistrusted their ability to remain contentious regarding their
decisions because they did not understand from experience the suffering of junior
soldiers, while Kennedy had a closer connection due to his junior rank in the Navy. For
one, his elder brother Joe, an officer in the military who was killed in an accidental
detonation of explosives, possibly due to a design defect that was not properly addressed
by the Navy’s board of review.61 Additionally, John F. Kennedy’s friend Andrew
Kirksey, whom he poignantly called “the boy in my boat,” was killed in the famous PT109 boat commanded by Kennedy.62 Kennedy had always looked at history to learn what
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could result from a poor decision but his personal history added reality to the
consequences of inaction or misguided action. He was unwilling to give ground to Castro
and Khrushchev but he knew his soldiers as people who depended on his leadership.

These experiences gave Kennedy a lifelong desire to avoid armed conflict if
diplomacy could avert it, and strengthened his idealistic viewpoint that leaders are
obligated to avoid such conflict if possible. In the decade before the Cuban Missile Crisis,
Kennedy watched the American and Russian stockpiling of nuclear weapons with unique
apprehension. While he was “as passionately anti-communist as any of his advisors,” he
recognized the dangers of any form of warfare, especially one which involved nuclear
weapons.63 Witnessing firsthand the horrors of war allowed Kennedy to understand the
human cost of hawkish foreign policy. Although he was firm in his anti-communist
ideals, he was equally firm in his resolve not to enter a potentially disastrous conflict if it
could be avoided.

As President, he displayed the aforementioned ideals not only to his adversaries, but to
his cabinet and military advisors as well. This was manifested in his distribution of an
emerging bestseller among his assistants. In 1962, the same year as the Cuban Missile
Crisis, a historian named Barbara Tuchman published a historical bestseller titled The
Guns of August, which posited the view that “mistakes, misunderstandings, and
miscommunications can unleash an unpredictable chain of events, causing governments
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to go to war with little understanding of the consequences.”64 In The Guns of August, the
“unpredictable chain of events” led to World War I. Kennedy, seeing a parallel between
the misunderstandings which Tuchman claimed were responsible for World War I and
the potential for misunderstandings to lead to World War III, was piqued by the book. He
was reportedly “so impressed” with it that he “often quoted from it, and insisted his aides
[and military officers] read it,” then had the Secretary of the Army distribute it to “every
U.S. military base in the world.”65

One passage that struck John F. Kennedy involved two German soldiers asking
themselves why World War I started and why their lives were to be put at risk on account
of political disagreements at the international level; they were unable to find an answer to
this question.66 As a soldier, Kennedy likely pondered this question while on his PT-109
patrol boat, or whilst reading They Were Expendable. Tuchman’s book perhaps reminded
Kennedy of these days as a young officer pondering the inevitability of World War II,
which resulted in the deaths of his brother and friends and his own narrow escape. The
importance of The Guns of August with regard to Kennedy’s decisions is difficult to
determine, as it was published just before the Cuban Missile Crisis and would certainly
have attracted the President’s attention. However, it seems safe to assume that Kennedy’s
past sense of history did not conflict with the views presented in the book. In any case, he
found the book useful and brought the Cuban Missile Crisis to an end partly through
seeking to avoid the “miscommunications” condemned by Tuchman.

64

Dobbs, One Minute to Midnight, 226.
Ibid., 226.
66
Dallek, An Unfinished Life, 505.
65

Cerbone 20
William White’s fictional but realistic bestseller They Were Expendable had arguably
the greatest impact on Kennedy as a young serviceman. In the Navy, his motto onboard
PT-109 was, “They Were Expendable.”67 No other author captivated the position of lowranking personnel who struggle to serve their country, while coming to grips with their
wartime sufferings. Written in 1942, They Were Expendable is told from the perspective
of a patrol boat crew who suffer the misfortune of being “expandable.” That is to say,
their lives perceived as of little worth by senior soldiers and politicians who have little, if
any, frontline experience and whose agendas do not illuminate to them the reality of war.

They Were Expendable introduces the concept of expendability with an analogy from
one of the young naval officers. He calls to the author’s mind a sergeant machine-gunner
who is ordered to hold a position indefinitely. In such a situation, the serviceman claims,
“You know you’re expendable. In a war, anything can be expendable…usually men.
They are expending you and the machine gun to get time. They don’t expect to see either
one again.”68 In the military, a few moments or “a precious quarter of an hour” are worth
the life of a man.69 As in The Guns of August, the soldiers are left to ponder the greater
context of their misfortune. They find themselves questioning why they were sent to fight
in the first place and why they don’t receive adequate supplies and aid. In the words of
the officer, “Because we little guys [expendables] never get to see the broad picture of the
war, [we] never find out the reasons back of the moves or failures to move. We only see
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our part [and] can only hope help didn’t come in time for some sensible reason.”70 Here,
Kennedy could relate to other young servicemen who really fought in World War II,
whose concerns were unheard by hawkish officers who did not join them in the frontlines
and thus did not understand what it meant to be expendable. They Were Expendable was
able to convey the greater meaning of war to people who did not experience combat and,
although it was fictional, the plotline of White’s story became the reality for John F.
Kennedy and his comrades. Therefore, Kennedy was a president who understood from
experience what it meant to be expendable; he served as captain of a patrol, in company
of common sailors.

In They Were Expendable, a measure of direct criticism was aimed at senior officers,
such as General MacArthur. The decision to promote MacArthur to Commander-in-Chief
of forces in the Pacific, resulting in MacArthur being ordered to leave his position, meant
that the remaining forces were left to fend for themselves. To the servicemen, “our last
hope of seeing America and escaping a Japanese prison – was gone forever. Now the
MTB’s were like the rest here…the expendables who fight on without hope to the end.”71
Just as Kennedy criticized MacArthur for his absence on the frontlines, White critiqued
the Filipino politicians for “not appropriating money for the army – they’d set MacArthur
up with a big salary and a penthouse, and then hardly given him a dime to train and equip
an army – it was all window-dressing.”72 John F. Kennedy therefore mistrusted judgment

70

White, They Were Expendable, 187.
Ibid., 104-105.
72
Ibid., 54-55.
71

Cerbone 22
of senior officers during the Cuban Missile Crisis. When they advocated bombing Cuba
and potentially starting a nuclear war, Kennedy felt that he better understood what it was
like to be “expendable,” and didn’t want the people who would have fought in a nuclear
war with the Soviets to become as such.

Additionally, John F. Kennedy was influenced by The Forty Days of Musa Dagh,
Franz Werfel’s tale of Armenian life during the Turkish genocide during World War I. A
central point Werfel makes is that evil must be resisted. According to his biographer
Walter Donovan, Kennedy read it enthusiastically.73 The novel speaks of the evolution of
differences that threaten the world; the transition of “the old sporadic fanaticism of
religious hatred” that “had been skillfully perverted into the cold, steady fanaticism of
national hate.”74 As in Kennedy’s time, the World War I era was polarized between two
opposing sides, with conflicting ideas, that threatened to erupt into violence.
Werfel’s arguments are useful against the philosophy of appeasement but also against
losing faith in one’s ability to overcome adversity. In a notable part of Werfel’s novel,
one character dismisses the importance of addressing the genocide with the words,
“‘[Please] realize that, in this Armenian destiny, certain historical forces, too vast for our
control, may be working themselves out.’” The other character replies, “‘Every man and
every nation at one time or other becomes the weak. That’s why nobody should tolerate
persecution, let alone extermination, as a precedent.’”75 After the Cuban Missile Crisis,
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Kennedy would say in a speech, “Too many of us think [peace] is impossible. Too many
think it unreal. But that is a dangerous, defeatist belief. It leads to the conclusion that war
is inevitable, that mankind is doomed, that we are gripped by forces we cannot control.”76

Kennedy agreed with this concept in The Forty Days of Musa Dagh, with the key
emphasis being placed on the phrase “we cannot control.” Kennedy continued to refute
that notion, saying, “We need not accept that view. Our problems are man-made –
therefore, they can be solved by man. And man can be as big as he wants. No problem of
human destiny is beyond human beings.”77 He attributed “reason and spirit” to the human
ability to conquer “seemingly unsolvable” obstacles.78 Kennedy “solved” the Cuban
Missile Crisis in part because he fervently believed that he was able to do so. The idea
that humans must step aside and allow atrocities or war to occur when it could be
prevented, simply based on the fact that they believe that historical forces are “beyond
human control” did not resonate with Kennedy. As president, he understood that it was
both his right and his duty to take control of the situation and resolve it to the best of his
ability. Therefore, writings and occurrences during the World War I era implemented the
idea that problems need not be repeated on account of past mindsets that they must repeat
and allowed him to demonstrate that he indeed learned from history.
Reading material that left an indelible impact on young Kennedy included Pilgrim’s
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Way, alternatively titled Memory-Hold-The-Door, an autobiographical set of memoirs by
John Buchan, later known as Baron Tweedsmuir. Tweedsmuir reminisced about his early
life, experiences during World War I, and provides ample advice and critiques of political
and social life in the British Empire. The Kennedy Library lists Pilgrim’s Way as among
Kennedy’s personal favorites, while Senator Ted Kennedy dedicated some remarks to the
memoir during the Kennedy Library and Museum’s Rededication Ceremony of 1993. In
reference to President Kennedy’s famous commencement address at American University
in 1963, Senator Kennedy said, “For Jack, ‘commencement is what America is all about.
The words he loved and lived by were from his favorite book, ‘Pilgrim’s Way’ by John
Buchan.”79 John F. Kennedy’s favorite quote by Buchan epitomized his philosophy of
political service: “‘Public life is regarded as the crown of a career, and to young persons,
it is the worthiest ambition. Politics is still the greatest and most honorable adventure.’”80
Tragically, his brother Robert F. Kennedy would himself be assassinated shortly after
paraphrasing this quote to “a gaggle of newsmen.”81

Just as John F. Kennedy was encouraged to think independently by his father, so too
did Buchan encourage analytical, futuristic thinking. “The tragedy of man,” he wrote, “is
that he has developed an intelligence eager to uncover mysteries, but not strong enough
to penetrate them…[we] pose questions which we are sometimes capable of asking but
rarely able to answer.”82 John F. Kennedy sought to increase his knowledge in an effort
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to provide these answers; he was able to seek and find solutions to both the everyday
challenges of the United States and one of historical proportions. Had Kennedy been the
embodiment of this “tragedy,” the result could have been tragic for humanity as well.

One figure Buchan admired was Prime Minister Arthur Balfour, in part because he
“revered the fortitude of human nature, the courage with which men stumbled up the
steep ascent of life. It was the business of a leader, he thought, not so much to put quality
into his following as to elicit it.”83 Balfour possessed the unique ability to see the values
of both old and new systems, to retain the best of both worlds and act as a leader who
inspires and elicits quality from his followers. Like Kennedy himself, Buchan believed
that humanity had both the ability and the responsibility to create a better, freer world. “It
was our freedom,” he wrote, “our steady nerves which convinced me that we could build
up the world anew and embody in it the best of the old.”84 Buchan, with a quote eerily
similar to Kennedy’s own in his commencement address, stated, “No experience can be
too strange and no task too formidable if a man can link it up with what he knows and
loves.”85 Kennedy not only encouraged others to overcome their challenges in his
address, but also lived by this adage himself.
Interestingly, Buchan’s relevance in Kennedy’s life was not only as an admired author
– Kennedy and Buchan shared several key experiences and arrived at similar conclusions
as a result of these experiences. Just as Kennedy’s family acquired great wealth and had
the opportunity to travel and learn, so too did Buchan experience a period of wealth
Buchan, Pilgrim’s Way, 158.
Ibid., 167.
85
Ibid., 167.
83
84

Cerbone 26
shortly before World War I. Like the Kennedys, he enjoyed travelling, reading and
yachting.86 Furthermore, Buchan was acquainted with Kennedy’s father during the
latter’s ambassadorial visit to Britain in 1938. He encouraged the British government to
treat Kennedy with respect, seeing in him “a man of great ability and independent
character,” if “‘rather different from the ordinary ambassadorial type [and] clearly out of
the diplomatic mould.’”87 Finally, John Buchan’s conclusions in the aftermath of World
War I resonate with John F. Kennedy’s during World War II.
In Pilgrim’s Way, John Buchan dedicates a portion of his memoirs to the generation of
young men lost during World War I. He lost friends, classmates, his wife’s cousin, and
his youngest brother to the war. This chapter, which suggests themes present in White’s
They Were Expendable, resonated most strongly with Kennedy’s experiences in the Navy
during World War II: “Losses, which a few years before would have seemed cataclysmal,
became a matter of course.”88 As a result, Buchan criticized the perception of war as
glorious and inevitable. “There was no uplift of the spirit, such as is traditionally
associated with battle,” he wrote, “I acquired a bitter detestation of war, less for its
horrors than for its boredom and futility, and…its panache [glorification.]”89 To Buchan,
“To speak of glory seemed a horrid impiety.”90 To a young soldier during World War II,
his own services would seem a repetition of diplomatic shortcomings during a previous
generation, a mistake Kennedy himself would not want to repeat as President.
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Richard D. Mahoney writes that Kennedy “jotted down” quotations from Pilgrim’s
Way in a notepad he kept with him during World War II, as a tribute to the lives lost as a
result of war.91 Geraldine Hawkins, quoting biographer Geoffrey Perret, writes that
Kennedy was especially touched at the death of Buchan’s thirty-five-year-old friend,
Raymond Asquith. The untimely death of such a courageous and brilliant soldier was the
“passage that made the deepest impression on Kennedy,” who throughout his life would
“‘urge anyone he wants to understand him to read Pilgrim’s Way, for the light that he
begins moving towards shines out from that book.’”92 Kennedy was especially touched at
Buchan’s descriptions of young and courageous men forced to sacrifice themselves
because war could not be averted. Therefore, he associated himself with the courageous
and young who ran the risk of losing their lives for a cause. Kennedy, while willing to
serve his country, did not want his sacrifice to be for no reason.

The writings of Tuchman, White and Buchan, coupled with his own experience in the
Navy, left a profound impression on him during his political life. Kennedy would seek to
end the Cuban Missile Crisis diplomatically not because he was afraid or because he was
not set in his principles, but because he did not want to unnecessarily sacrifice another
generation of Americans in what would have been a catastrophic nuclear war. He did not
want future generations questioning whether he could have done anything to prevent a
nuclear war. In accordance with Buchan’s advice, Kennedy conducted foreign policy
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with the beliefs that he could overcome any challenge with sufficient determination and
that he had the responsibility as a leader to attempt to do so.

Perhaps no author received more public praise from Kennedy than Basil Liddell Hart,
a military theorist and historian. In 1960, both Kennedy and his opponent Richard Nixon
were invited to review Hart’s latest work, Deterrent or Defense. Nixon declined, while
Kennedy wrote, “No expert on military affairs has better earned the right to respectful
attention…For two generations has brought to the problem of war and peace a rare
combination of professional competence and imaginative insight.”93 Kennedy held Hart’s
judgment in high esteem, for “his predictions and warnings have often proved correct.”94

Hart is something of an anomaly; on one hand, he is praised by some, such as
American historian Jay Luvaas, who called him “one of the most profound, original and
influential military thinkers of modern history.”95 Hart, whose military thinking
continued to evolve and develop in the preliminary stages of World War II, was also
praised by Brian Bond, who admired his predictions of battles during the war and the
“number of egregious defeats” suffered by Britain, notably in May of 1940, alongside the
French, when fighting the German Wehrmacht.96 Ultimately, the most widely accepted
portrayal of Hart’s views regarding World War II is that he had a clairvoyant
understanding of the actions the two sides would take and was able to accurately predict
93
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the outcome. He “fully understood the danger represented by Nazi Germany, was an
archfoe of appeasement,” and opposed it when Hitler demanded the Sudetenland territory
of Czechoslovakia in 1938, a feeling which was ignored by “hidebound” British
generals.97 In 1981, the Congressional Military Reform Caucus’s principle spokesman
said in part, “[The] British…ignored prophets like Liddell Hart. But Hart’s strategy was
picked up by the Germans, who used it with devastating effect in 1940.”98 This more
common view of Hart presents him as a tragic figure who was able to (and did) give
sound advice to policymakers during the build-up to World War II but was disregarded
by most of his intended audience. This version of Hart also appears in some of Kennedy’s
interpretations as well. For example, Hart’s advice against appeasement corresponded to
Kennedy’s in his dissertation, Why England Slept, in which he quoted Hart several times.

Alternatively, Hart is criticized for lack of evidence to suggest that he opposed
appeasement, with some postulating that there is evidence to the contrary. Some claim he
“argued forcefully” for appeasement in 1938, that his “policy prescriptions” were more
closely aligned with Neville Chamberlain, that his advice had no impact on German
victories during battles, and that he was “almost completely wrong in his estimations of
what the World War II battlefield would look like and what would happen when the
German and Allied forces finally clashed.”99 It is also important to consider that Hart’s
advice, while considered sound by Kennedy, is largely restricted to military matters, and
does not ascribe the same attention to diplomatic tactics that Kennedy provided in a
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review of one of Hart’s works.
Basil Hart’s postulations had a key impact on young John F. Kennedy. In 1940, he
quoted Hart in his thesis, Why England Slept, admiring Hart’s view, “I do not criticize
persons, but only a state of affairs. It is they, however, who will have to answer for
deficiencies at the bar of history.”100 Kennedy went on to emphasize Hart’s sense of
preparedness and exhaustive strategies, criticizing the armies during World War II as
“suicide clubs” due to their “grave deficiencies.”101 In one example, stated Kennedy,
“Hart…pointed out that the number of guns to a division was not sufficient for a barrage
of one Infantry battalion,” and that the number of battalions under the Cardwell system
was not sufficient to repel enemies.102 From Hart, Kennedy honed his ability to question
the system itself, an ability which would be further shaped during his time in the Navy,
and when reading They Were Expendable. That Basil Hart’s advice was not highly
regarded by the afore-mentioned “hidebound” generals convinced Kennedy that senior
military officers and policy-makers do not always make their decisions in the best
interests of their men or even with regard to fighting a war efficiently.

More importantly, Kennedy praised Hart’s Deterrent or Defense, in which Hart
argued that, while nuclear weapons provide a useful deterrent to any attack by the Soviet
Union against the West, they should not be considered an adequate defense against Soviet
forces in general. Due to the destructive nature of such weapons, Hart said, they must be
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kept “high up the sleeve” and used only in the event of a last resort. 103 In fact, the Soviet
Union was more likely to favor a different method of attack because “the Western
Powers’ capacity for nuclear retaliation should suffice to deter Russia from launching a
large-scale invasion of free Europe.”104 Nuclear weapons actually possessed a
disadvantage that they could be used only as a last resort weapon, for “[There] are no
degrees of importance in the matter of suicide.”105 That is to say, should nuclear war
erupt, both sides would lose because the Cold War policy of mutually assured destruction
dictates that both sides would be destroyed. Therefore, it is not enough for the West to
possess nuclear weapons; they should also develop conventional forces to use in smallscale conflicts, such as defending Europe.
Kennedy, in his review of Deterrent or Defense, agreed, “The notion that the free
world can be protected simply by the threat of ‘massive retaliation’ is no longer
tenable.”106 Both Hart and Kennedy disagreed with Richard Nixon’s policy of relying on
nuclear retaliation, with Kennedy agreeing with Hart’s “grand theme” that the United
States “must be prepared to face down Communist aggression, short of nuclear war, by
conventional forces.”107 Furthermore, Kennedy concluded from reading Deterrent or
Defense that “responsible leaders in the West will not and should not deal with limited
aggression by unlimited weapons whose use could only be mutually suicidal,” and that
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this should also be the policy of “responsible military leaders.”108 This would account for
his decision not to readily bomb Soviet missile sites on Cuba and provoke a nuclear war.
On the contrary, Kennedy advocated for “a strengthening of the free world’s defense and
new, purposeful efforts to bring the weapons of mass destruction [and their use] under
effective international control.”109 Still, he was unwavering in his desire to provide a
strong message that he would never be “blackmailed” or “forced” to allow Communism
to spread into the free world.110
Kennedy would speak highly of his career as a young officer in the Navy, saying, “I
can imagine a no more rewarding career,” calling it “worthwhile” and providing “pride
and satisfaction.”111 Nevertheless, his experiences in the Navy would finalize his idea that
senior military officials and policymakers did not always act in the best interests of their
soldiers. In a letter to his sister Kathleen, he would write, “‘The glamor of PTs just isn’t
[there] excepting to the outsider.’”112 Kennedy was critical of the efficiency, citing their
“inadequate” guns, torpedoes, engines, radios, lack of proper armor and propensity to
become “floating infernos when hit.”113 It transpired that “the failure lay…with the
tactics followed by all PT boat captains and circumstances beyond Kennedy’s control.”114
Kennedy became a war hero due to his misfortune of commanding “the only PT boat ever
rammed in the entire war,” which resulted in two of his mates being killed and Kennedy
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being forced to relay a message in a coconut shell demanding rescue.115 Kennedy would
refuse to be hailed as a hero, instead bestowing the title upon his deceased comrades. He
would recall this incident for the rest of his life, keeping memorabilia from the PT-109
episode in the Oval Office during his tenure as president.116 This would have a dramatic
effect on the way he interacted with military officials during the Cuban Missile Crisis.

Kennedy made certain never to allow the perceived experience of military officers to
overrule his brand of logic. He considered his own wartime experiences to be deeper than
those of even his closest military aides. He had found himself involved in the war and
forced to face the gruesome aspects of combat, but he did not feel that his superior
officers understood from experience how their decisions affected their inferiors. His
refusal to adhere to his hawkish generals as President is reflected in his writings as a
young soldier. He felt that senior officers “give the impression of their brains being in
their tails.”117 This resulted, he claimed, in “the super-human ability of the [military] to
screw up everything they touch.”118 He “reserved his harshest criticism” for the highestranked officers whom he saw as sending men to their deaths while they remained
unwilling to risk their own lives.119 One example is his contempt for General Douglas
“Dugout Doug” MacArthur, pointing out that the nickname was derived from
MacArthur’s “refusal to send in army troops to relieve the marines…and to emerge from
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his ‘dugout in Australia.’”120

Kennedy learned to question the knowledge and experience of generals who actually
had little experience regarding the dangers of warfare because they were usually
cloistered away from the fighting. When given the chance to avoid a nuclear war with the
exchange of the removal of missiles from Turkey, and an American promise not to
invade Cuba, for the removal of missiles from Cuba, he responded to opposition, “[In]
two or three days we may have a military strike which would bring perhaps the seizure of
Berlin or a strike on Turkey. We should take [this deal.]”121 He used his own judgment
over objections from his generals because he felt he had a better understanding of what
was at risk. He felt that their decisions might result in miscommunications or the inept
response he had always criticized.

Finally, John F. Kennedy was shaped by his understanding that negotiating with an
enemy involved showing respect, something influenced by the military theorist Basil
Hart. Hart’s words provided one of the strongest influences on Kennedy’s foreign policy
during his presidential career. “Keep strong,” was Hart’s advice; “keep cool. Have
unlimited patience. Never corner an opponent, and always assist him to save his face.”122

Kennedy referred to these concepts of patience and aiding an opponent in saving face
during the negotiations, especially when he agreed with Walter Lippmann’s advice: agree
to remove “obsolete” missiles from American bases in Turkey in exchange for Russia’s
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cooperation in removing missiles from Cuba.123 Additionally, Kennedy “appreciated how
difficult it must have been for Khrushchev to back down,” as the removal of missiles
from Turkey was kept secret for several decades to avoid public outcry. Kennedy showed
his appreciation by advising his cabinet against “premature jubilation” and “gloating.”124
Kennedy understood that in order to maintain the peace he would need to respect his
adversary and their need to “save face” in the eyes of their own people. Furthermore, in
accordance with his father’s belief that war was devastating to both winners and losers,
John F. Kennedy was not arrogant in his relief that the Cuban Missile Crisis was averted;
for the victory was twofold – both the United States and the Soviet Union “won” the war.
John F. Kennedy’s experiences as a diplomat’s son and as a junior officer during the
World War II era ingrained in him the desire to favor good judgment over potentially
disastrous warfare. From his father he learned to have and defend his own opinions and
had the chance to see the strengths and weaknesses involved with different forms of
foreign policies, and began to question the infallibility of superior officers. From the
military he saw firsthand the repercussions of decisions on the part of superior officers or
politicians who never served in the frontlines, and came to believe that he as President
had the obligation to exhaust all possible courses for peace before finally turning to
aggression. From the military he also came to the conclusion that a decorated officer does
not always understand the effects of his decisions on countless soldiers in the frontlines.
This caused Kennedy to always question the judgment of his advisors urging him to
bomb Cuba. Each of these factors contributed to his handling of the Cuban Missile Crisis.
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Most important of all, Kennedy was himself. He had a profound knowledge of history
and an incredible ability to weigh in on his options, as well as a feeling of obligation to
do what was best. He would not stand aside and allow Cuba a chance to launch a nuclear
attack on his country, nor would he begin an armed conflict if he had the chance to avoid
it, understanding the weight of his choices. Kennedy was influenced by each of the
factors discussed but his sense of history shaped his perception of these experiences and
caused him to examine policies he had witnessed during his lifetime in the context of
history. He was able to predict potential errors during the Cuban Missile Crisis because
he had studied foreign policy and failures thereof. This made him the man who led his
country from the brink of nuclear conflict with Russia to a peaceful settlement that
benefited everyone. Kennedy’s presidency was eventful for the decisions he made during
a two-week period, but these decisions were the result of a lifetime of experience.
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